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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
vs.

Case No.
13642

VERA MASON
DEFENDANT AND APELLANT

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
UPON PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a petition for rehearing
of case no. 13642 made pursuant to Rule
76 (e) Utah Rules of Procedure alleging
error in the prior decision.
DISPOSITION ON PRIOR HEARING
This Court, voting three to two
affirmed defendant's conviction by a jury
at the district court level.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant seeks rehearing, reconsider-

ation of a portion of the court's prior
ruling, and consideration of matters not
dealt with in the Court's majority opinion
although raised by Defendant's earlier brief,
and reversal of judgment and vacation of
sentence pursuant thereto.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
So far as material to this rehearing
the facts are as follows:
Defendant, at her trial for theft,
was questioned about use of narcotics on hte
morning of trial and answered in the affirmati
the questions and answers being allowed over
Defense Counsel's objections.
Later, David 17. King, a police officei
was recalled to the stand to testify for the
State. He gave an account of his experience
in narcotics work, and his training in that ax
(R114); gave his opinion as to what the effect
of two balloons of heroin (the quantity Defendant had earlier admitted to using) would
Digitized
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
School,
BYU.
haveby the
onHoward
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"normal"
person
if Law
the
narcotic
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had

-3now being a quarter to four?" (Hospitalization
(R. 115); gave his opinion as to the state of
an "addict" under the same time interval
(wanting some more; but neither extrenaly high
nor in painful withdrawal) (R. 116). Under
cross-examination by Defense Counsel Officer
King testified about "cutting" of heroin and
strengths (R. 117); kinds of heroin (Mexico
brown and French white) (R. 118); the kind and
typical strength of heroin available in Salt
Lake City (Mexico brown, "...typically 3 to 7
per cent") (R. 118), and gave an opinion that
an "addict"having taken a two bolloon dose at
8:30 A.M. would not by the time of day he was
testifying be "off in another world" (R. 119).
Deferidant's objections were overruled
by the Court three times, (R. 110, 111) a s t o
admissions being elicited from the defendant/
witness. The testimony of the officer as exper
was objected to for lack of relevance (R. 114)
Digitized
the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU.and
for bylack
ofW. foundation
(R. Clark
114,
115)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

over-

ruled in each case. The State did not offer
and the record does not disclose any proffer
of testimony which would tend to show the
truth of defendant's admissions (as to use of,
or being a user of drugs) by any independent
evidence whatsoever. Nor does the record
disclose any more that generalized statements
by Officer King as to the effect of two balloo
on a "normal" person or an "addict". There is
no testimony whatever that Officer King tied
his observations or conclusions to the
defendant as an individual on that he made any
observation of her or that he was able to form
or elucidate any judgment as to her condition.

ARCUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT, IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO ERROR
IN PERMITTING POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY

AS

EXPERT TO THE EFFECTS OF NARCOTICS IN GENERAL
TERMS ON A "NORMAL" PERSON AND ON AN "ADDICT"
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HENCE TO TESTIFY WITHOUT ANY PROBATIVE RE_
LATIONS11I.P TO THE DEFENDANT'S CONDITION ON
THE DAY OF TRIAL, MISAPPLIED THE LAW BY
APPLYING A CIVIL RULE TO A CRIMINAL CASE AS
TO THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF EXPERTS: AND
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT INDEPENDENT FOUNDATION OR RELATIONSHIP TO THE DEFENDANT
THEREIN MISAPPLYING THE RULE OF LAW AS ADOPTED
BY THE WEIGHT OF U.S. AUTHORITY.

It is true that the trial judge has
considerable latitude as to the necessary
qualifications of and the need for expert
witnesses to help the jury understand matters
before them for decision, as both Apellant
(Defendant) and Respondent (State) have agreed
in thdir previous briefs. Apellant cites
Startin v. Madsen, 120 U 631, 237 P2d 834;
Webb v. Olin Hathieson Chemical Corp., 9 U2d
275, 342 P2d 1094, 80 ALR2d 476. Respondent
cites
Commission
Silliman,
22
Digitized
by theRoad
Howard W.
Hunter Law Library, J.v.
Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

u2d 33,

-6~
418 P2d 347 (1968); Marsh v. Irvine, 22 U2d
154, 449 P2d 996 (1969); Stanmeyer v. Leathara
Broas, I n c M

20 U2d 421, 439 P2d 279 (1969).

It is, however, a misapplication of
that generalized principle to rule that the
trial court's indisputably considerable
latitude of discretion is so broad that if the
trial court finds the expert witness competent
his testimony is admissible and no abuse of
discretion occurs in a criminal case.
In all the Utah cases cited above, the
actions were civil in nature, and it connot
be demonstrated from the cases that any substantial amount of prejudice in the fact findt
mind would have been turned against the
appellant party by the expert testimony. That
that what the experts said in the above cases
would in any way inflame the jury or judge
against him, or cause the fact-finder to
find against him on an extraneous ground of
Digitized
by the Howard or
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Lawthe
School, apellant
BYU.
animosity
prejudice
toward
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prejudice is narrowly understood

in the law.

All these cases turn on whether or
not experts were needed, or if they were if
they were competently qualified

to speak to th

jury authoritatively arid with expertise.
None of these cases involves

testimony

of an allegedly narcotics-using witness himor herself on tiral in a felony case. None
of these cases relates to narcotics-use inquiries in any way. Yet, narcotics use when
admitted in evidence is beyond doubt

inflammat

to criminal juries against the user whether
witness or defendant. Thus the rule is that
it is only proper subject for testimony when
the offense itself involves use, sale or
possession or when it goes to the witness's
credibility and ability to recall. By explorir
the effect on the witness's mind at the time c
the observations he is testifying to, to see
if his perceptions of events is tinged with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

druefcv unreality. Bv inauirinp into the courtr

-8competency of the witness to testify coherently and without distorted

recollection

where recent use is suspected*
The kajority opinion in the prior
consideration of this case seems to leave the
entire matter in the hands of the trial court
and to rely on S illiman and Stagmeyer

as

authority for doing so, without ever addressin)
the issue of prejudice to the defendant by
admission of expert testimony without probativ<
value.
The testimony of the State 1 s alleged
expert was never related to defendant in any
meaningful way

(as was pointed out in the diss<

on the prior hearing of this case). Hence that
testimony had no materiality and could only
have operated to prejudice the defendant in
the jury's eyes.
It has been stated that such an
introduction of prejudicial material can resul
in infringement of the right to a fair trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may 1
contain
errors. App 3d 526,
E.g. People
v. Telio,
111,

275

-9NE2d 22Xat

225 and cases there cited.

To disregard

the extremely

degrading

and prejudicial effect of drug use allegations
upon a criminal defendant's jury image and
to leave the matter entirely within the "considerable latitude of discretion 11 of the
trial judge when Constituional rights to
fair trial are at stake, and then to rely
on civil cases as a prop for that almost
unfettered discretion, is, defendant respectfully submits, misapplication of an otherwise
valid principle of law from a different area
to the criminal lav; in an unwarrantedly broad
fashiion. As such, it is a proper subject for
rehearing. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 U. 157,
Jl» —

129 P .

.

•

in i im

,ll

mill | « — — — — • • — • ill • • •
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619.
A matter which materially

affects

this Court's ruling, hence also a proper matte
on rehearing, idem, is the matter of lack of
foundation for the officer's

testimony.

TheW. majority
does
Digitized by the Howard
Hunter Law Library,opinion
J. Reuben Clark Law
School,not
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deal wit

-10this aspect of defendant's prior argument at
all unless it is implicit in the sentence
"the trial judge passed upon the qualification
of the (expert) witness, and the propriety
of his testimony as was his prerogative •lf
The point appears to have been overlooked,
yet defendant previously argued lack of
foundation and the foundation

requirement

at pages 1 2 , 13, 1 4 , 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and
22, Brief of Defendant, Case No. 13642, State
of Utah v. Vera Mason,

U.2d

,

P2d

(1975). In fact, this point in various aspects
and implications forms the basic thrust of
defednat f s Point II in prior argument. On prio;
submission the State's brief does not controve:
defendant's lack-6f-foundation argument at
any point, except to baldly assert that it
was "not abouse" to let King's testimony in,
and even if it were, the prejudicial nature,
if any, went only to the "weight" to be given
to it by the j ury.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11On the other hand, the better reasoned

cases

are abundantly clear that a foundation must
be laid or the testimony of a narcotics
expert is wholly inadmissible. People v. Telio
supra., and people v. Ortega, 2 Cal.App.3d
888 at 903, 83 Cal.Reptr. 260 at 271 and
cases there cited; 52 ALR2d at 848 - 849.
If, as stated in 52 ALR2d, "the view
adhered to ... by the weight of authority
is that ...expert testimony as to the effects
of the use of drugs, is not considered admissible to impeach the credibility of a
witness unless followed by testimony

tending

to show that he was under the influence while
testifying ... .If then here the testimony of
Officer King was wholly inadmissible. In a
slightly different form this is the "foundation
required by Telio: " A foundation must be laid
... a failure to ob so can ... result in infringement of the right to a fair trial ....
It was improper for the State's attorney to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12ask (the witness) whether he used narcotics
without being able to prove that he was an
addict or a user of drugs. The ttial judge
erred in allowing

(that information) to the

jury." J U L , 275 NE2d 222 at 225.
Officer King's expert testimony as
to the effects of narcotics on hypthetical
average persons, addicted and unaddicted,
let it be said again was never related in
any meaningful way to the defendant/witness
as an individual. As the prior dissent has
noted his testimony did not "tend to show
guilt or innocence of the defendant, nor did
it tend to contradict her testimony
it was) testimony

...(hence

... unsupported by a proper

foundation and ... immaterial and ... prejudicial. "
If there was any "peg" for this
testimony to hang upon, any foundation such
as the cases require to meet the Constitutional
standard for fair trial, it must be found in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13defendant's own admission that she had used
narcotics that morning. This, however, is
material elicited for another purpose, A
purpose which this court has held a.permissible one, i.e. to shed light on her credibility for the jury. It was obtained over
defense counsels strenuous objection.
It can hardly be the holding of this court
thata defendant, immune from the stand by
constitutional privilege, may be questioned
for a permissible purpose, then have her incourt admission, elicited over her counsel's
objections thereafter available to the State
for a different purpose, to provide a foundation, the platform from which the State's
expert discredits her by vague free-floating
generalizations about narcotics effects.
Just as admissions of a defendant
cannot be used to supply deficiencies in the
state's alleged corpus delicti, thereby relieving the State of even the necessity of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

• 14so, by analogy, it is unthinkable that
defendant's judicial admission unwillingly
extracted can thereafter be the basis upon
which inspecific, nebulous testimony of
drug effects is grounded and brought in
aginst defendant and over her counsels
repeated objection to provide not help for
the jury but fodder for speulation and coal
to the fire of prejudice against defendant
already kindled by her reluctant admission of
heroin use.
Nothing was ever proved about the
extent, if any, of defendant's "habit11.
Nothing about the type of drugs used. Nothing
about the strength. Never did the State adduce
or even offer a scintilla of independent
corroborative evidence tending to meet the
Telio

requirement that the state's foundation

must consist at least of "being able to prove
(the witness) an addict or a user of drugs."
Digitized
by the Howard W.ideas
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reubenplay
Clark Lawmust
School, BYU.
Rudimentary
of fair
require
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15the State to prove this minimum before
bringing in an expert to discredit defendant,
especially where as in this case defendant
(had she known what was in store) could
have stayed completely off the stand as a
matter of right, and thus robbed the §tate
of its gratuitous "foundation" and avoided
the subject of narcotics use altogether and
hence the prejudice that undoubtedly arose
from it in the jury's minds.
To rule otherwise is to permit the
prosecution to impermissibly bootstrap itself
up to and past the legal requirement of a
"foundation" it was unprepared and quite unable to have presented on its own.
The State had already played its
narcotics-user card to trump the earlier
trick of the credibility inquiry.
Came time to play its Ace of Trumps
(the state narcotics expert) the State Attrone)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16would have overtrumped the by now helpless
defendant with his Ace, but had only this one
card left and by the better considered eases
and fair-play without the requisite foundation
lead card he needed to get back into his
hand*
It is prejudicial enough to the
defendant to have before the jury her recent
use of narcotics without allowing the prosecution to manufacture out of that one admission
as well the foundation it could never supply
on its own for the coup de grace of damning
(albeit vague and speculative) expert testimony*

CONCLUSION

Defendant was prejudiced in two ways
by the admission of Officer King's testimony
as to narcotics effects* First, the evidence
Digitized
by the Howard
Huntergeneral
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU.
he gave
wasW.In
terms,
about
average
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or

-17hypothetical people and was never related
to her condidtion on the day of tiral or
otherwise and hence had no probative effect
as to her guilt or innocence or as to her
credibility, the purpose for which it was
ostensibly admitted. It therefore served
only to inflame and prejudice the jury against
her. Secondly, the testimony of Officer King
was wholly inadmissible even though it might
have had some evidentiary or advisory value
to the jury, since without foundation as
required to meet the standards of fair trial
and since it depended for its introduction
solely upon an in-court admission of defendant
which she could have avoided making as a
matter of right by staying off the stand, and
was not grounded on any other corroborative
or independent foundational proffer by the the
State.
The Court is respectfully urged to
dismiss the verdict against Appellant as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.
having been
improperly
rendered
as a matter

of

-18-

law and is requested to vacate the sentences
imposed on defendant pursuant thereto*

Respectfully submitted,
GALEN ROSS, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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